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Abstract
Why do we use epistemic modals like might? According to Factualism, the function
of might is to exchange information about state-of-affairs in the modal universe. As
an alternative to Factualism, this paper offers a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic
possibility operators in a Bayesian setting. The background picture is one whereby
communication facilitates coordination, but coordination could fail if there’s too much
uncertainty, since the players’ ability to share a belief is undermined. However, might
and related expressions can be used to reveal one’s uncertainty, and exploit this to
coordinate despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. The final result is a way
to articulate a non-Factualist view of epistemic possibility modals that builds on their
standard semantics.
1 Coordination in Times of Uncertainty
Shiv and Logan want to spend time together over the coming weekend. They prefer to go to
the beach if it will be sunny and to a café if it will be raining, but they will only go to either
place if the other goes. Their predicament is the familiar one of a coordination problem
(Lewis, 1969). In a variant known as the signalling game, Shiv and Logan solve their
coordination problem by sending a signal, namely an utterance that reveals information
initially available to only one of the players, for instance about whether it will be sunny or
rainy (Lewis, 1969; Skyrms, 2010).
It’s relatively well-understood how Shiv and Logan coordinate if the relevant infor-
mation is public, or can be made public through communication. Roughly, q is public
information within a group just in case all members of the group believe that q, all believe
that all believe that q, all believe that all believe that all believe that q, and so on ad
infinitum. A stronger condition than public belief is public knowledge (also called common
knowledge), which plays a central role in many areas of inquiry, in philosophy as well as
elsewhere (Lewis, 1969; Fagin et al., 1995). The stronger condition won’t be needed for the
topic of this paper, and I’ll focus instead on public belief.
∗For any feedback or comments, please email me. Do not cite without permission.
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Sometimes however, beliefs fail to be public. Even worse, sometimes a belief cannot be
made public, and communication of ordinary matters of fact doesn’t help. Such may be
the case, for example, when too much uncertainty undermines the possibility of sharing a
belief, or so I will argue below. Is there still a way to coordinate then?
There are things to say. For example, even if she is uncertain, Shiv could venture one
of the following.
1. (a) It might be raining.
(b) Perhaps it will be raining.
(c) Maybe it will be raining.
In her context, if Shiv utters a sentence in (1) she would be naturally understood as
suggesting to go to a café for the weekend, almost as if she simply asserted that it will
be raining, while at the same time hedging that assertion. She is raising the possibility of
rain, as it were, and that may be enough to persuade Logan to stay indoors. It is very
natural for Shiv to continue (1b) as in (2a), much less natural (and not even so coherent)
to continue as in (2b).
2. (a) Perhaps it will be raining. Let’s stay in.
(b) Perhaps it will be raining. Let’s go out.
Even if the speaker is not in a position to outright assert that it will rain, the interlocutors
might still coordinate on going to a café by means of something less committal than that
assertion.
The present paper offers an analysis of epistemic possibility modals in signalling theory.
Epistemic possibility modal auxiliaries and adverbs, and expressions of close kin (might,
perhaps, maybe, possibly, probably, etc.) are natural resources to employ in case coordi-
nation is challenged by the lack of a common epistemic ground. I explore the intuitive
idea that using epistemic possibility modals is a way of hedging an assertion, or, as I will
also say, of expressing uncertainty. I will show that strategic hedging can be helpful with
coordination problems, despite critical failures of public belief.
But I also have a broader goal. The project of this paper touches on a larger question,
roughly: what is the function of epistemic modality in speech? What purpose does it serve?
David Lewis’s (1969) classic work on signalling provides a plausible rationale for linguistic
conventions writ large: they arise to support coordination. Here I claim, in kindred spirit,
that the raison d’être of epistemic possibility talk is to support coordination in times of
uncertainty.
This claim is controversial. For an alternative view may seem straightforward: take
the standard semantics for might, according to which epistemic modals are quantifiers over
possible worlds, and combine it with a form of descriptivism, according to which words
serve to describe reality. The result is Factualism about epistemic modality:
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epistemic modal talk serves fundamentally to describe some feature of reality,
to say how some aspect of the world is. ... there is a certain class of facts, the
facts about what is (epistemically) possible, or probable, or necessary. (Yalcin,
2011, 296)
In other words, people resort to saying ‘Might φ’ in order to state that there is a possible
world compatible with what someone (typically, the speaker) knows or believes. Accord-
ingly, we use might to describe a corner of the modal universe.
This conclusion is puzzling: ordinary lives and practices are rarely concerned with
otherworldly state-of-affairs. When Logan has to decide for the café or the beach, how
does information about remote possible worlds help him? Yalcin (2007, 2011) has some
objections to Factualism about epistemic modality, which I’ll discuss in due course. He
rejects it, but in doing so he rejects the standard semantics for might. I think, however,
that we simply shouldn’t buy into Factualism, while keeping the standard semantics. The
semantics is a story about what a sentence ‘Might φ’ represents or describes the world as
being like. The challenge is to articulate a view about how to go from the semantics to the
dynamics of belief change and decision-making prompted by an utterance of ‘Might φ’. I
will provide a non-Factualist view that does this. I will build upon the standard semantics,
but I will recruit game-theoretic resources to explain how the use of epistemic possibility
modals factors in inference and action. The function of ‘Might φ’ is not to describe modal
reality, but to coordinate action when public belief fails.1
2 Failures of Coordination
My focus is on sentences in which an epistemic possibility operator takes wide scope, as
(1) above. I leave a few comments about embedded might for the last section, and a
discussion of epistemic necessity for another day. I begin in this section by presenting
two scenarios in which coordination between two agents is challenged by their uncertainty,
which undermines the possibility of publicly sharing a belief. I then derive conditions
for the existence of a coordination equilibrium despite their uncertainty. In §3, I’ll add
communication to the agents’ interaction, and in §4 epistemic modality. Sections 5 and
6 make formal sense of the idea that might expresses uncertainty, and that this can help
with coordination. This provides a strategic rationale for epistemic modality. Finally in
§7, I’ll come back to the question of Factualism.
1The question of Factualism, as I understand it, is somewhat orthogonal to one’s choice of semantic
theory. However, some semantic theories that might be relatively better positioned to face the epistemo-
logical questions that are relevant here: for example, dynamic (Veltman, 1996; Yalcin, 2007; Willer, 2013),
probabilistic (Lassiter, 2016; Moss, 2015), and proof-theoretic semantics (Incurvati and Schlöder, 2019). For
lack of space, I do not broach the complicated general question how the game-theoretic account I present
here maps onto these alternatives to standard semantics. On the more general question of Factualism, the
present paper owes much to Price’s (1990) work on negation.
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I’ll start by setting the stage. Consider the game of Table 1. Shiv (the column player)
prefers to stay in, a, if Logan (the row player) stays in, and prefers to go out, b, if Logan
goes out. Same for Logan. It’s a coordination problem.
S
a b
L
a 1, 1 0, 0
b 0, 0 1, 1
Table 1: Coordination Game
Given the numbers in Table 1, the players are indifferent as to staying in or going out
so long as each does what the other does. Hence, they might as well toss a (fair) coin to
coordinate, under some previously agreed upon stipulation: for example, they will stay in
if and only if the coin lands heads. Suppose furthermore that only Shiv can see the coin:
she will then report to Logan the outcome of the coin toss by sending a signal (‘It’s tails!’).
Coordination comes easily (Rabin, 1990; Stalnaker, 2006).
We can imagine that Shiv and Logan coordinate by “pivoting” on the weekend being
rainy or sunny, rather than the coin landing heads or tails, as well as on any other mutually
exclusive propositions q and q̄ (for all practical purposes, propositions are sets of possible
worlds). The agents prefer a if q and b if q̄, by previously agreed upon stipulation. If Shiv
believes that q, she may signal so, and thereby share her belief with Logan. Neither Shiv
nor Logan has reason to deceive the other, since either receives a positive payoff just in
case the other does. Moreover, the players know this. Therefore, once a belief is shared by
signalling, it becomes public: both believe it, both believe that both believe it, and so on.
If q is public between Shiv and Logan, the rational (utility maximizing) choice for both
is a. If q̄ is public, the rational choice for both is b. This is a version of the traditional
signalling game described by David Lewis (1969) in his foundational analysis of linguistic
communication.2
Belief may fail to be public because people are distracted, uncurious, or unintelligent.
The impasse here is “solved” by a sleight of idealization, of the kind that is ordinarily
invoked in studies of rational agency (Fagin et al., 1995). I will assume that Shiv and Logan
are Bayesian agents who do not suffer from such accidental shortcomings of rationality.3
2I am simplifying a bit. (1) Lewis talked about common knowledge, rather than common belief, but the
stronger condition doesn’t add much at this stage: we can coordinate on something false, so long as enough
of us believe it. (2) Lewis assumed that the agents didn’t speak a common language. He did so in order
to show that conventional meanings can emerge as equilibria of the signalling game. I do not have this
explanatory burden and drop the assumption. (3) Lewis worked with the notion of a Nash equilibrium, but
the idea of solving the game by reference to an event with a given prior probability (the coin lands heads,
the weekend will be rainy) leads in fact to a generalization known as correlated equilibrium (Aumann, 1987;
Vanderschraaf, 1995), with which I work in the current paper.
3A Bayesian agent is someone whose credences are mathematically coherent, and who updates by Bayes
rule. Logical omniscience is not needed for the analysis below, which makes it more plausible.
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Belief may fail to be public because one or more players aren’t opinionated, or even if
everyone has the same opinion, it may not believed by everyone that everyone does. In
these cases, sharing information leads to coordination, as we saw in the previous paragraph.
Still, there are more complex cases of failure of public belief known to the literature, that
are at least not obviously failures of rationality, and for which more information about
ordinary matters of fact does not help. I’ll discuss two structurally similar examples.4
The first scenario is a modified form of a popular story. Two generals will defeat the
enemy only if they share the belief that they will attack, but since their communication
channel is unreliable, they don’t share that belief, and won’t win.
The Two Generals. Two generals approach their common enemy from op-
posite directions. If a general attacks while the other doesn’t, the attacker will
be defeated with heavy casualties. If a general doesn’t attack, nothing happens
to him. If they attack simultaneously, they will win. However, neither can see
what the other does, and they must rely on messengers crossing enemy lines to
go from one general to the other.
Since there is no guarantee that a messenger reaches destination, even if a general sends
‘I will Attack!’, he will not attack without confirmation from the other general in the
form of a message ‘Copy. I will Attack!’. But there is no guarantee that the second
message reaches destination either, for the same reasons. And so on for any finite number
of messages. Therefore, neither general ever attacks, even after thousands of ‘Attack’
messages have been received by both sides! We can assume, without loss of generality, that
each general thinks himself an attacker. But neither general believes that the other believes
that both will attack. Failure of coordination results from the unreliability of the generals’
communication channel, which prevents the belief that both will attack from becoming
public.5
The second scenario is structurally similar in some relevant respects. This time, Shiv
and Logan are planning for dinner. However, they are trying to coordinate on something
vague.
Vagueness. Shiv and Logan just moved to a new town. They have been told
about a great restaurant. If the restaurant is close, they would like to go there
for dinner, but since they are quite tired, they prefer to eat in if the restaurant
is far. They can either go out or stay in, but if either goes while the other
doesn’t, both will eat alone and be miserable.
Sometimes, a restaurant is neither definitely close, nor definitely far. There is no sharp
boundary between close and far, and, in the “borderline area”, Shiv and Logan may not
4A further step is taken by Harvey Lederman (2018), who argues that no belief can ever be public. This
possibility need not detain us.
5The first version of the two generals’ story appeared in Akkoyunlu et al. (1975). Gray (1978) is the
most frequently cited source. There are many variants.
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be very confident that the restaurant is close, so that, even if both believe that it is close,
they do not believe that both believe that it is close: the other could easily have a different
opinion. As for the two generals, coordination for Shiv and Logan is undermined by the
failure of a particular belief to be public.
Vagueness has been linked to uncertainty, or lack of confidence, in various ways (Edg-
ington, 1992; Smith, 2014; MacFarlane, 2016). In terms of credences, let’s say that an agent
i thinks that q just in case i has some positive degree of confidence that q is the case, that
is, i assigns to q probability greater than the probability i assigns to its complement q̄. In
the borderline area, Shiv may think that the restaurant is close, although her confidence
remains low: indeed, below a relevant threshold. Above the threshold, Shiv thinks that
the restaurant is definitely close, or, as I shall say, she believes that it is close. At least
notionally, belief is an all-or-nothing matter.
Of course, this is not an analysis of ‘think’ and ‘believe’, but a stipulation for describing
a probability distribution over propositions. The stipulation plausibly fits with at least
some informal uses of ‘think’ and ‘believe’, as we shall see. Accordingly, to think that q
is to have some credence > 1/2 that q is the case, whereas to believe that q is for one’s
credence in q to be above a certain threshold, somewhere between 1/2 and 1. Credences
have been understood differently in the philosophical literature, but for current purposes I
set aside metaphysical questions about them (for discussion, see Weisberg, 2020).
What is a confidence threshold? In ordinary life, many factors contribute to one’s level
of confidence. In the context of the game, a qualitative characterization might help: i
believes that q just in case i thinks that q, and thinks that others think that q as well.
That is, one believes that q just in case one is confident enough that q is the case to think
that others think that q as well. And so someone who thinks that the restaurant is close
is uncertain (or, remains below the relevant confidence threshold) so long as she has a
reasonable expectation that others are not of the same opinion. Similarly, a general who
thinks they will attack but does not think that the other general thinks they will attack,
is uncertain.
The terminology of thinking, believing, and being uncertain, may sound misleading.
Does belief imply certainty? Not if ‘certainty’ means ‘lack of Cartesian doubt’, but it
might if it means ‘having high-ish confidence’. I mean the latter. Arguably this is a
reasonable reading of at least some natural occurrences of the word ‘belief’, on which to
say ‘I believe that φ’ indicates conviction. Likewise, there is a sense in which one could
be confident that something is the case while believing that others disagree: but this just
shows that there are other characterizations of the technical term ‘confidence threshold’
besides what I offered. That’s fine. It’s worth keeping in mind that Shiv and Logan, as well
as the generals, are supposed to be rational epistemic peers: if they think that q expecting
that someone else does not think that q, who is equally rational and in the same epistemic
position, then they should be less confident about their judgement. I assume that they
are. That’s the sense of ‘confidence’ that is relevant here.
If confidence thresholds and shared attitudes line up in this way, the failures of coordi-
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nation in The Two Generals and Vagueness can be seen as failures to share a belief about
what both believe. The causes of these failures appear to differ: the unreliability of the
general’s communication channel in one case, and vagueness in the other. On reflection,
these causes may not even be that far apart: language itself, in the borderline area, may be
too unreliable a medium. I am not interested in pushing the analogies too far. It’s enough
to say that, given the descriptions of the two scenarios, the beliefs that aren’t public cannot
become so. It is built into the descriptions of the cases that more communication won’t
make the uncertainty disappear.
An abstract description of the two scenarios might help highlighting their structural
similarities. Let there be at least three discrete states w1, w2, w3 in the agents’ environment.
In w1 the agents think that q, in w3 they think that q̄, and in w2 an agent thinks that
q while the other thinks that q̄ (or vice-versa, but we need to worry about one case only,
the other being analogous). The relevant possibilities for both generals are that they both
attack, that neither does, and that only one does. If a general thinks he will attack,
his problem is that he can’t distinguish a world in which both attack from one in which
the other doesn’t. And while the relevant possibilities for Shiv and Logan are that the
restaurant looks close to both, or far to both, or far to one and close to the other, if Shiv
thinks that the restaurant is close, then her problem is to distinguish worlds in which the
restaurant looks close to her and to Logan, from worlds in which the restaurant looks close
to her but not to Logan.
We can represent this situation by letting the agents partition the logical space differ-
ently. A partition is a set of jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive subsets of the space
of relevant possibilities. Each agent i has their own partition, according to which worlds
are sorted into q-worlds and q̄-worlds. An agent i ‘fails to distinguish’ a world w from any
w′ that belongs to the same cell to which w belong, according to i’s partition. Figure 2
represents two different partitions: the first general, or Shiv, on the left, and the second
general, or Logan, on the right. In w1 both think that q, in w3 both think that q̄, and they
go separate ways in w2. The use of partitions to represent an agent’s mental state goes
back to Aumann (1976).
w1
w3
w2 w2
w3
w1
S L
Figure 2: Different partitions of the logical space
Despite the lack of public belief, equilibria exist in which the players choose a if they
believe that q, and choose b if they believe q̄. As above, they prefer coordination, and they
both know this. Each agent represents the beliefs that q and that q̄, about themselves as
well as the other, as in Figure 2. Therefore, each expects that their beliefs will be not
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aligned sometimes, and indeed they share a prior γ concerning the chance that this is the
case. Let γ and δ be real numbers between 0 and 1:
p(w1) = δ(1− γ) p(w2) = γ p(w3) = (1− δ)(1− γ)
That is, with chance γ the agents guess that they don’t think what the other thinks, that
is, they are in w2. They assign complementary probabilities to the rest of the cases.
6
Plausibly, an agent i chooses a only if i thinks q. If so, the expected utility of a for i is
the sum of the utilities of choosing a while the opponent chooses a, and then b, weighted
by the probabilities that these choices are made. Let ui be i’s utility function, and j be i’s
opponent.
eui(a) = p(qi & qj) · ui(a, a) + p(qi & q̄j) · ui(a, b)
By table 1, according to which ui(a, b) = 0 for either agent, and by Bayes rule, this simplifies
to
eui(a) = p(qi) · p(qj |qi) · ui(a, a)
Consider S first, as in Figure 2. The probability that S thinks that q is δ(1 − γ) + γ,
and the conditional probability that L thinks that q given that S thinks that q is just the
proportion of cases in which L thinks q out of those in which L does: δ(1−γ)δ(1−γ)+γ . Hence
euS(a) = δ(1− γ).
Consider L. The probability that L thinks that q is δ(1− γ), and the probability that
S thinks that q given that L thinks that q is just 1, for all cases in which S thinks that q
are cases in which L does too. It follows that euL(a) = euS(a). By the same reasoning,
euS(b) = euL(b) = (1 − δ)(1 − γ). Therefore, the coordination equilibrium (a, a) obtains
only if euS(a) > euS(b) and euL(a) > euL(b), and so, only if δ > 1− δ. Similarly, the (b, b)
equilibrium obtains only if 1− δ > δ.
I have assumed in the preceding paragraph that γ 6= 1. This seems reasonable, since
γ represents the chance that an agent doesn’t think in the way the other does. In other
words, so long as misalignment in belief isn’t inevitable, coordination equilibria exist despite
uncertainty. While reasonable, this conclusion is not very strong. For even if the agents
are rational, and reason as we just did that coordination equilibria exist, it doesn’t follow
that they will coordinate. The uncertainty may still be too much for them to make a move.
An upper bound on γ would help. Well, it seems plausible to say that a sufficient
condition for i to choose a is that both players think that q, that is, both consider q more
likely than not. Then, a is a best response for both if p(qi & qj) > 1/2. Then a is played
if δ(1− γ) > 1/2, namely if
γ < 1− 1
2δ
(CT1)
6Technically, probabilities are only assigned to sets of possible worlds, in order to uniformly represent
an agent’s credal state. Therefore, ‘p(w)’ is short for ‘p({w})’, but we spare the painful details.
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and by similar reasoning, b is played if
γ < 1− 1
2(1− δ)
(CT2)
The confidence thresholds CT1 and CT2 suffice for coordination on (a, a) and (b, b) re-
spectively. These inequalities presuppose that δ is neither 0 nor 1, but the generality of
the conclusion is not lessened, for if one has credence 0 or 1 in a proposition, there should
be no failure of public belief among rational Bayesians. The numerical values in CT1 and
CT2 have been chosen somewhat arbitrarily (if the confidence threshold should be higher
than .5, for instance if it should be .75, it can be made so without changing the outline
of the argument), but the conclusion is representative of a general point. Two conditions
characterize the existence of a coordination equilibrium in conditions of uncertainty. For
the (a, a) outcome, for example, it must be that δ > 1− δ and γ < 1− 12δ .
In this section I have presented two intuitive scenarios in which coordination may
fail due to the agents’ uncertainty. If the agents’ confidence that some proposition q is the
case, a belief that q can’t be public: given the descriptions of the cases, the belief that both
believe that q cannot be shared. Furthermore, I have given analytic proof of the intuitive
claim that, if the chance γ that their thinking differently is not too high, coordination may
still obtain: the inequalities CT1 and CT2 specify what “not too high” means.
3 Assertion
The existence of a coordination equilibrium despite uncertainty does not depend on the
agents communicating, but follows from their sharing a certain prior under constraints
of rationality. Communication is an efficient method to find an equilibrium. For this, it
suffices that the agents have two signals, φ and ψ: roughly, ‘I will Attack!’ and ‘I will Not
Attack!’, or ‘The restaurant is close’ and ‘The restaurant is far’. For clarity, I will write
ψ as ¬φ, although nothing depends on the presence of an overt scope-taking operator of
negation. To study how signalling facilitates coordination, I start with a basic semantic
framework.
Let W be a set of (contextually relevant) possible worlds, and J·Kg an interpretation
function relative to a variable assignment g, that maps a signal (an utterance) to its
semantic content, itself a function from possible worlds to truth-values. (Henceforth, I
drop the superscript to avoid clutter. I also ignore context-sensitivity, to keep things
simple.) I make two assumptions: the interpretation of φ is q, and that of ¬φ is q̄.
JφK = λw.w ∈ q
J¬φK = λw.w ∈ q̄
With respect to Figure 3 below, it may appear as though φ “means” {w1, w2} for S, but
{w1} for L.
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S: JφK = {w1, w2} L: JφK = {w1}
J¬φK = {w3} J¬φK = {w2, w3}
One is therefore tempted to conclude that φ and ¬φ mean different things when uttered
by one or the other agent. But this conclusion equivocates. The agents do speak the same
language, according to which φ and ¬φ mean q and q̄ respectively. This is so, for both
of them. In addition, by analyzing the propositions q and q̄ as sets of worlds, we (in the
metalanguage) can make distinctions that the agents don’t make: recall that S does not
distinguish w1 and w2, and L does not distinguish w2 and w3, prior to communication.
The possible world analysis allows us to represent the agents’ partitions of the logical
space geometrically, as in Figure 3, which is an aid to intuition. But the fact that this
representation assigns different sets of possible worlds to q and q̄, relative to different
partitions of the logical space, does not imply that φ and ¬φ “mean different things” to
different agents.
φ
¬φ
w1
w3
S w2 w2
w3
w1
L
1− γ
γ
Figure 3: Signalling game under uncertainty
Sending signals φ and ¬φ, interpreted as q and q̄ respectively, reveals to the signal
receiver what the signal sender thinks, and this is how they coordinate—though not always,
for they might not think the same. Suppose first that S thinks that q̄. Then she sends ¬φ.
Moreover, upon receiving ¬φ, L thinks that S thinks that q̄, for S has no reason to deceive
L. Therefore, a signal ¬φ is how L can distinguish a possibility in which L thinks that q̄
and S does too, from one in which L thinks that q̄ and S doesn’t. In addition, L thinks
that q̄ in any circumstance in which S does, hence if ¬φ is sent, S and L believe that q̄.
Moreover, since they can reason to this point, they believe that they believe that q̄, and so
on. Therefore, if ¬φ is sent, q̄ is public.
If instead S thinks that q, she sends φ and L thinks that S thinks q, but L thinks
either q or q̄ with probability 1− γ and γ respectively. So, S signals φ if she believes that
q, and signals ¬φ if she believes that q̄, for in both cases she thinks that something is the
case with enough confidence that she also thinks the other thinks the same. The remaining
cases obtain with γ frequency and can be interpreted as those in which S wrongly guesses
what L thinks.
It’s convenient to call assertion the action of an agent who signals φ while believing that
q, as opposed to merely thinking that q. That is, an agent asserts φ just in case she utters
a sentence whose content she believes. Such use of the term ‘assertion’ may be justified by
loose reference to Grice’s (1975) Maxim of Quality. The Maxim prescribes, roughly, ‘Assert
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only what you believe’. Reference to Quality is loose because I am employing ‘belief’ as a
quasi-technical term, and while Grice’s informal use is arguably compatible with mine, it
might just be no more than that.
With communication (and relative to the game in Figure 3), S and L coordinate on
doing a if φ is asserted, and on doing b if ¬φ is asserted. With γ chance, S utters φ as she
thinks that q, but L thinks that q̄, and therefore S chooses to do a while L chooses to do
b. This may be as good as it gets, if their common language is indeed limited to φ and ¬φ.
Shiv and Logan, or the generals, will then have to learn to live with the occasional failures
of coordination.
4 Hedging an Assertion
If the agents’ language includes epistemic vocabulary, then they could make their uncer-
tainty manifest. This could potentially matter because, intuitively, an utterance of ‘Might
φ’ allows interlocutors to make finer-grained distinctions in speech about their attitudes
towards φ, indicating their commitment or degree of confidence. For example, Shiv and
Logan could attempt to coordinate in the Vagueness scenario by uttering one of (3).
3. (a) The restaurant might be close.
(b) Perhaps the restaurant is close.
(c) Maybe the restaurant is close.
Rather than an outright assertion that the restaurant is close, if they are uncertain they
could more strategically reveal what they think by hedging. Using epistemic language to
disclose one’s attitude more precisely adds information that can be potentially exploited
for coordination. Importantly, this is not semantically encoded information, but something
that can be retrieved inferentially, by observing how language is used in the circumstances
in which it is used. The agents reflect upon what has been said, and what else could have
been said, to derive conclusions about each other, and figure out how to take action.7
Suppose that, besides the two signals φ and ¬φ, the agents’ language includes epistemic
vocabulary. They can utter sentences such as ‘Perhaps the restaurant is close’ and ‘Perhaps
the restaurant is far’, or ‘Maybe I will Attack’ and ‘Maybe I will Not Attack’. First, we
need to extend the semantics to the modality with respect to the game under discussion.
The general idea is that a sentence ♦φ is true just in case φ is compatible with some body
of information, indexed to some agent. We can intuitively say that ♦φ is true at a world w
7It may well be that the sentences in (3) are not equivalent in all respects, for reasons that have to
do, for example, with the embeddability of might but not of perhaps under operators on semantic content
such as if and believe (Incurvati and Schlöder, 2019). Everything I say is meant to apply to all epistemic
possibility modals. The natural linguistic kind that is my target in the present paper is what Incurvati and
Schlöder (2019) call weak assertion: a speech act typically performed by a speaker who utters a sentence
whose main operator is an epistemic possibility modal.
11
g.
sb
ar
d
ol
in
i@
u
va
.n
l
just in case there is some agent i in the game who, in w, thinks that φ. With appropriate
idealization about the rationality of the agents in the game, this is plausible enough. By
this light, in w2 one may truly say, ‘It might be that φ and it might be that ¬φ’. That
seems the right thing to say when one is uncertain.
Formally, the semantic framework is expanded with a function E : W → 2W from
worlds to sets of them. Intuitively, Ew is the set of worlds (in the context) accessible to a
world w, according to some proper epistemic accessibility relation. The standard semantics
for ♦ is in terms of E.
J♦K = λQλw.∃w′ ∈ Ew : w′ ∈ Q
The interpretation function is compositional. Since JφK = λw.w ∈ q, it follows that ♦φ is
true at w just in case there is a w′ accessible from w such that q is true at w′. Finally,
we should to say what ‘accessible’ means. Recall that a partition is a set of worlds that,
intuitively, an agent cannot distinguish prior to communication. For convenience, we might
simply say that a world in a partition is accessible to any other world in the same partition.
In other words, w′ is epistemically accessible from w just in case there is someone who
cannot distinguish them.
On this semantic sketch, ♦φ is strictly weaker than φ, for ♦φ is true so long as at
least someone thinks that φ is true. This proposal comes close to the influential discussion
of Kratzer (2012), and von Fintel and Gillies (2011). Epistemic possibility modals are
quantifiers over a (contextually restricted) set of possibilities that are salient to some agents.
Use of ♦φ indicates a certain epistemic perspective on φ, namely, that φ is true as far as
someone in the relevant group thinks (typically, the speaker). I skip the finer points of
epistemic modality in natural language, which would require a discussion of phenomena
that go beyond the scope of this paper, such as modal subordination and evidentiality (von
Fintel and Gillies, 2010; Lassiter, 2016; Mandelkern, 2019; Roberts, 2019).
The semantics, however, is not be the end of the story. Contrary to Factualism, the
function of might is not to state that there is a possible world of some kind, or that some
relations obtain somewhere in the modal universe. Its function is to raise a possibility,
albeit with some hesitation or uncertainty. I’ll give a more precise characterization of this
idea in the next section.
5 Inference
Following Stalnaker (1978, 1999, 2002), conversation is a cooperative enterprise whereby
interlocutors narrow down the common ground (the set of possibilities that are “live” for
them, at that point in the conversation). The task for the listener is to figure out which
world is actual, given what the speaker said: the listener knows what else could have
been said, and the information semantically encoded in the utterance, and infers what the
speaker thinks the actual world is like. I will describe this process as a Bayesian inference
to explain how an utterance of ‘Might φ’ raises a possibility, and expresses uncertainty.
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Suppose that, according to Shiv, it might be raining: she thinks it will rain, but she
can’t tell if Logan thinks so as well. In this situation, Shiv has ruled out the possibility that
both her and Logan think that it will be sunny, but the belief that it will be raining is not
public, for she is uncertain about what Logan thinks. Logan has to figure out which world
is actual, according to Shiv. I will indicate with cg(0) Shiv and Logan’s common ground
at time 0, that is, at the beginning of their interaction. The times to consider are 0 before
communication, 1 after an utterance is sent, and 2 after the listener has guessed what the
actual world is. It’s helpful to understand this temporal progression as a listener-centered
process, though something analogous might be going on for the speaker, insofar as the
speaker can think through what the listener does.
Since Shiv believes that ♦φ, she asserts so. An assertion is a proposal to update the
common ground (Stalnaker, 1978). Assuming the proposal is accepted by the listener, a
new common ground is defined by the update. Since J♦φK is the information compatible
with ♦φ, we calculate the effect of an assertion of ♦φ by intersection.
cg(1) = cg(0) ∩ J♦φK = {w1, w2, w3} ∩ {w1, w2} = {w1, w2}
Thus, an assertion of ♦φ rules out the possibilities incompatible with φ. This is all standard,
both the semantics (Kratzer, 2012; von Fintel and Gillies, 2011), and the dynamics of
assertion (Stalnaker, 1978). Accordingly, the effect of asserting ♦φ is typically informative:
intuitively, an assertion of ♦φ tells you that the actual world is not a ¬φ-world. What can
the interlocutors deduce from this?
A simple hypothesis is that all possibilities compatible with what interlocutors mutually
accept are equally likely to be the actual world. This general idea gives us a simple formula
for base-rate probabilities for which world is actual.
For all times t and for all w in cg(t) : p(w) =
1
|cg(t)|
Once the agents narrow down the common ground to {w}, the probability that w is the
actual world is 1. In cg(0), we have p(w1) = p(w2) = p(w3) = 1/3. These priors are easily
definable given the notion of common ground, conceived as a set, as in Stalnaker’s classic
work. It is implausible to assume that ordinary speakers would be able to volunteer these
likelihoods, because they can’t count possible worlds to begin with (especially since they
cannot distinguish them sometimes), but this account gives us a natural description of the
interlocutors’ credal state, during a conversation.
Once the assertion of ♦φ is accepted, cg(1) = {w1, w2}, and therefore p(w1) = p(w2) =
1/2. At this point, the listener may reason as follows. Assuming the speaker is truthful,
a world in cg(1) is the actual world, but there are only two signals compatible with this
information, namely φ and ♦φ. The speaker wouldn’t send φ unless she believes that q, in
which case we are in w1 (see Figure 3). And she didn’t send φ. Therefore, she does not
think that we are in w1. Since w2 is the only other world in cg(1), w2 must be the actual
world according to the speaker.
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This reasoning can be formalized in a Bayesian setting. At time 1, after the update,
L has equal priors for the worlds in cg(1). Moreover, L expects S to be truthful. Since a
truthful speaker could send both φ and ♦φ in cg(1), and nothing else, L holds even priors
for the events that these signals are sent.
p(φ) = p(♦φ) = 1/2
Finally, L expects S to send φ in w1, not in w2. For, an assertion that φ reveals the
speaker’s belief that q, but the speaker believes that q only in w1. Therefore, L’s conditional
probability for the event that φ is sent, given that w1 is the actual world, is nearly 1. As
for ♦φ, it will be sent with probability approximately 0 in w1, since in w1 we know that
φ is sent with probability approximately 1. So, ♦φ will be sent in the only other world
compatible with its content, namely w2.
p(φ|w1) ≈ 1 p(♦φ|w1) ≈ 0
p(φ|w2) ≈ 0 p(♦φ|w2) ≈ 1
The last step is for L to update by Bayes rule. The posterior probability that a world is
actual is calculated by conditionalizing on the evidence, namely the observation that ♦φ
was sent.
p′(w2) =
p(♦φ|w2) · p(w2)
p(♦φ)
≈ 1 · 1/2
1/2
≈ 1
In this sense, by signalling ♦φ the speaker raises the possibility that w2 is the actual world:
she quite literally raises the probability that this is so!
Thus, the listener takes a guess at the speaker’s credal state, estimating that it’s one
of uncertainty. We can also describe the inference in the ideology of possible worlds, but
we must be careful: it would be wrong to say that by uttering ‘Might φ’ the speaker
says (semantically, as it were) that the world is w2 and not w1. The difference between
these worlds is one whereby both believe something, or only one does. Recall, however,
that the speaker does not distinguish between these two worlds, prior to communication.
Indeed, the distinction the agents can draw is between q and q̄. This is a distinction about
matters of fact. There is a further distinction about confidence levels that we use worlds to
represent. The agents are sensitive to it, because their payoffs depend on it, but it is not
tracked by the semantics of the language fragment they use. (Of course, such distinction
is tracked by the semantics of other sentences, such as ‘I am confident that φ’, and so on.
But we have not assumed that the agents have these sentences in their vocabulary.)
Nevertheless, the agents become aware of a distinction between confidence levels by
using epistemic language. From the observation that ‘It might be raining’ was uttered,
with the semantics it has, and given what else could have been uttered, the listener draws
a conclusion about the speaker’s confidence level. This conclusion may be plausible, but
need not be more than that. It could well turn out that the speaker is unduly cautious,
and that both believe that it will be raining. That is, the listener’s inference is a defeasible
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one, and not a semantic entailment. Like ordinary pragmatic reasoning, the conclusion of
the reasoning above is information not packaged in the semantic content of the sentence
that was uttered by the speaker. The sentence ‘It might be raining’ is (semantically) not
about the speaker’s, or anybody’s credal state: though information about one’s confidence
level can be defeasibly derived from the observation that it was used.
Indeed, the listener’s inference as I described it is closely related to the derivation of a
scalar implicature (Grice, 1975, 1989). Scalar reasoning too can be analyzed in Bayesian
terms in a closely analogous way (Franke, 2011; De Jaegher and van Rooij, 2014; Franke
et al., 2012; Lassiter and Goodman, 2017). My suggestion, however, is not that epistemic
possibility modals trigger scalar implicatures: such claim is difficult to evaluate, for it does
not seem that ‘Might φ’ is less informative than φ, in the way in which ‘At least two F s
are G’ is less informative than ‘Exactly two F s are G’, other things being equal. (It’s not
as if ‘Might φ’ is “less true” than φ.) It’s more promising to take scalar implicatures to
be instances of more general inferential abilities, which may be seen elsewhere along the
boundary between semantics and epistemology (Goodman and Stuhlmüller, 2013; Good-
man and Frank, 2016).
In this section I began reaping the benefits of a Bayesian approach to epistemic modality,
built on a game-theoretic setting. I have shown in what sense the use of might and related
expressions can serve to raise a possibility, and how doing so may reveal information about
an agent’s confidence level, that need not be packed into the semantics of ‘Might φ’.
6 Action
Finally, it’s time to turn to action. If ‘Might φ’ is asserted, how do agents react? I have
assumed so far that agents do a if they think that q, and b if they think that q̄. This is,
however, a rather crude assumption, for we might want to say that uncertainty comes with
indecision (cf. MacFarlane, 2016). Consider the following interaction:
Logan: ‘I can’t find Fred’.
Shiv: ‘Perhaps he’s in the garden’.
Logan goes to the garden looking for Fred.
This seems to be a perfectly rational sequence of events. If Logan’s credence that Fred is
in the garden is just below 0.5, Logan doesn’t think that Fred is in the garden, but may
or may not go there looking for him. Logan is undecided. However, if Shiv were to tell
Logan that Fred might be in the garden, then that could be a reason to go out. An account
of how this works is straightforward, under the general assumptions I have already made
regarding the rationality of linguistic agents.
Suppose that Shiv thinks that the restaurant is close and that Logan thinks that it
is far. Shiv’s basic expectation is that she will go out and Logan will stay in. But then,
they won’t coordinate. However, if she says ‘The restaurant might be close’, she thereby
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signals her uncertainty to Logan, and might therefore reasonably expect this to have some
consequences. In particular, she will have expectations about Logan’s reactions to her
manifestation of uncertainty. And then she will have higher-order expectations about
what her reaction is to what she expects Logan’s reaction to her utterance is, and so on.
The result is essentially an instance of iterated back-and-forth reasoning between speaker
and listener.8
It helps to imagine this expectation-building process as speaker-centered (though a
reflective listener could go through the steps as well). For simplicity, I focus on a case in
which S thinks that q and that L thinks that q̄, the converse being analogous (that is, we
are in w2). The process begins with the speaker manifesting her uncertainty by signalling
‘Might φ’. Doing so, she expects that the listener would at least hesitate before taking
action. I indicate with pi(x) the probability that agent i performs action x.
9 The process
is broken down in various steps.
Step 0: Prior to communication. S thinks that q, so she chooses action a. There is
no hesitation here. The speaker’s prior is pS at step 0.
pS(a) = 1 pS(b) = 0
At this stage, the listener also acts unhesitatingly and coordination fails (in w2).
pL(a) = 0 pL(b) = 1
Step 1: Taking communication into account. The speaker signals ♦φ and expects
that the listener wouldn’t stubbornly choose action b, but rather be at least somewhat
undecided. Plausibly, L’s expected hesitation is a matter of taking a random action
between a and b. The listener’s prior is pL at step 1.
pL(a) = pL(b) = 0.5
Step 2: Building expectations upon expectations. The speaker now reflects about
what L’s expectations are regarding S’s action in response to L’s priors. Each next
step from now on is obtained by normalizing an agent’s prior with the opponent’s.
p′S(a) =
pS(a)
Σi∈Ipi(a)
=
pS(a)
pS(a) + pL(a)
=
1
1 + 1/2
= 2/3 ≈ 0.666
8There are two slightly different frameworks one could use to reconstruct the expectation-building pro-
cess: iterated best response models of pragmatic reasoning (Franke, 2011), and rational speech act models
(Frank, 2017). See Qing and Franke (2015) for a comparison between the two. The discussion in this
section is inspired mainly by rational speech act models, but could be carried out in other settings with
some adjustments.
9More precisely, pi(x) is a conditional probability, of doing x given that one thinks that q. But now I
am simplifying both notation and discussion, by holding fixed that we are in w2.
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Step 3: As in the previous step, one’s expectation for the opponent’s action is
obtained by normalizing the opponent’s prior at the previous step with one’s own.
p′L(a) =
pL(a)
pL(a) + p′S(a)
=
1/2
1/2 + 2/3
= 3/7 ≈ 0.428
And so on. By proceeding in this way, the probability that the speaker chooses a tends
approximately to 0.6, and the probability that the listener chooses a tends approximately
to 0.4. Conversely for b. Throughout this process, the speaker thinks that q and the listener
thinks that q̄, and they make no mistake about this: they share no public belief about q
or q̄, at the beginning nor at the end of this process. (Probabilities get normalized at each
step so that their beliefs remain complementary.)
Yet, just a few steps into expectation-building the agents’ expected utility increases by
a significant margin. Recall from §2 the value of an agent’s expected utility for action a:
eui(a) = p(qi & qj) · ui(a, a) = δ(1− γ)
This assumes that one gets a payoff for a just in case both think that q. But one’s payoff
for a increases, by the reasoning above, also in proportion to the probability that S thinks
that q, L thinks that q̄, but both do a. So we define a revised notion of expected utility,
indexed by the number of steps taken in the back and forth reasoning.
euni (a) = eui(a) + p(qS & q̄L) · pnS(a) · pnL(a) · ui(a, a)
At Step 0, the listener doesn’t think that q, and so p0L(a) = 0. Therefore, the overall
expected utility of a at 0 is simply eui(a), as in §2. But for all actions x, and for all steps
n beyond 0, the agents’ expected utility increases with respect to the sequence of steps.
eu0i (x) ≤ euni (x)
The general conclusion is this. An assertion of ‘Might φ’ triggers a process of mutual
reflection about what one expects the other will do, and higher-order expectations based
on that, and so on. The base step is the intuitively plausible idea that the speaker, having
signalled her uncertainty, expects the listener to react properly, by hesitating between a
and b. Based on this, the speaker reflects on how to react to the listener’s hesitation. As
a result, speaker and listener’s expected utilities improve.
Note that the agents need not have perfect powers of reasoning. They need not follow
the induction to infinity. It suffices that one or two steps are taken, and already the use
of ‘Might φ’ proves to be useful, in the very concrete sense that expected utility is higher.
The strategic advantage of ‘Might φ’ can be shown well within a bounded conception
of rationality. Public belief fails, but the chances of coordination improve by the use of
might. This is why epistemic possibility modals are used in speech: this is a game-theoretic
rationale for might.
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7 The language game of might
A strong motivation for the account of might I presented comes from a question about the
function of this and similar words. What do we use might for? What could be a reason
why human language contains words of this kind? The truth-conditional semantics tells
us that might is a quantifier over possible worlds. I don’t think that it also gives us an
answer to these questions. Factualism is the view that it does. But Factualism is not very
convincing: we don’t say ‘Might φ’ to tell each others how things are in the modal universe.
Very few of us (mostly philosophers) care about that. On my view, we say ‘Might φ’ when
we are not confident about φ, to express our uncertainty and thereby improve our chances
to coordinate despite the failure of public belief.
Rather than building the case against Factualism, my main goal in this paper has
been to offer an alternative explanation (among potentially many) of the role of epistemic
possibility in our cognitive lives. The case against Factualism has been brought in some
detail by Yalcin (2007, 2011, 2012), who then develops a form of Expressivism about
epistemic modals on which might operates on the structure of the common ground, without
contributing a proposition to it. Yalcin’s account has some similarities with my proposal,
and some interesting differences. I will conclude with some remarks on this.10
A big difference between the two accounts is, as I hinted above, that Yalcin does not
think that ‘Might φ’ expresses a proposition, in the canonical Stalnakerian sense. My
account is based on the premise that it does. Its standard semantics is important. As we
saw, an update by ♦φ does contribute information to the common ground, by virtue of
shedding possibilities: those in which it’s definitely the case that ¬φ. In this respect, an
assertion of ♦φ is informative, just like the assertion of any declarative sentence (except
tautologies). The information carried by ♦φ narrows down the agents’ possibilities, so that
an inference to the conclusion that the speaker is not very confident can be made, by a
simple application of Bayes’ rule.
Yalcin motivates his Expressivism, in part, by discussing Yalcin’s puzzle. The puzzle
is based on the observation that (4b) is infelicitous, but (4a) is not.
4. (a) Suppose it’s raining and I don’t know that it’s raining.
(b) # Suppose it’s raining and it might not be raining.
This is unexpected if ‘Might φ’ meant, more or less, ‘I don’t know that not-φ’. However,
we can explain the puzzle while remaining within standard semantics. What we need is a
story about the interlocutors’ mental states. The inconsistency in (4b) is one about the
attitudes of the speaker. On the account I presented, one asserts that it’s raining if one
believes that it’s raining, whereas one asserts that it might not be raining if one rules out
10Yalcin explicitly presents his account as a form of Expressivism, in the tradition of meta-ethical ex-
pressivists such as Gibbard (1990). Whether the account I presented is a form of expressivism depends on
a discussion of the (rather large) debate on expressivism in meta-ethics. I leave this question for another
time.
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that it’s raining, that is, thinks that it’s not raining but need not think that others think
so as well. Therefore, the conjunction ‘φ and ♦¬φ’ is an inconsistency at the level of the
logic of attitudes, for it commits one to both believe and rule out that φ. This explanation
is essentially the one given by Incurvati and Schlöder (2019) in a proof-theoretic setting.
They put it as follows: “assenting to φ and it might not be that φ immediately reduces to
both assenting and dissenting from φ” (Incurvati and Schlöder, 2019, 764). Since to assent
and dissent, or (as I said) to believe and rule out, are incompatible attitudes, the infelicity
of (4b) is predicted simply because one cannot suppose an inconsistency.
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